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Zusammenfassung
Die Ostseeregion ist das Produkt einer Übergangszeit, das dazu diente, die
Unsicherheiten während dieser Periode zu lösen. Diese Übergangszeit
nähert sich langsam ihrem Ende, und eine neue internationale Ordnung
zeichnet sich ab. Hat die Ostseeregion ein hinreichend starkes Image
etabliert, um das Ende dieser Periode zu überstehen? Es steht in jedem
Fall fest, dass die frühen Visionen von der Ostseeregion heute überholt
sind. Die Region steht nicht mehr im Blickpunkt der Weltpolitik, sie ist
vielmehr zu einer vertrauten Angelegenheit geworden, die weder große
Sehnsüchte noch besondere Spannungen hervorruft. Dennoch wäre es
falsch zu behaupten, die Ostseeregion sei im Verschwinden begriffen. Sie
existiert weiterhin als Teil der networking society im Norden, wobei die
involvierten Staaten deutlich weniger Interesse zeigen, die Region weiter zu
entwickeln.
Dr. Marko Lehti ist Dozent für Geschichte internationaler Beziehungen
am Institut für Zeitgeschichte an der Universität Turku.
Prediction is a difficult task in the field of social science; it is not possible to
foresee the future as such. Assuming there are no imponderables – which
is often not the case – one could extrapolate the previous development to
arrive at a forecast. In order to predict what the BSA will look like in 2010,
one must find the tools to construct the BSA of the future. In my opinion,
history offers these tools. Studying the past provides the answer to
questions such as “Why was the BSA conceived in the first place?” and
“Why did the BSA become such a widely accepted spatial coordinate in the
early 1990s?”. It is also possible to outline the ideal form of the BSA – how
the future was imagined a decade ago– and then examine the direction
taken by the development.
History also provides another example of Baltic Sea-based cooperation:
that of the interwar period. The idea of a BSA was first introduced after
World War I, leading to active cooperation among five Eastern Baltic states
(Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). This cooperation and the
feeling of unity did fade after the mid-1920s, but the idea of the BSA had its
supporters during the entire era. Hence, two narratives of the Baltics are
available to predict the future of the BSA: that of the interwar and that of the
early post-Cold War period.
A Product of the Transition Period
During the past 15 years, the image of the BSA has gained a
well-established position in the spatial imagination of Northern Europe.
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as early as 1987/88 an initiative for a New Hansa was introduced in the
German federal state of Schleswig-Holstein by the then Minister President,
Björn Engholm.1 Several alternative definitions for the idea of a BSA were
proposed in a subsequent series of international conferences and seminars;
the BSA became the potential vision for regionalization in Northern Europe.
The year 1991, in which a group of Baltic Rim parliamentarians convened
for the first time in Helsinki, saw the beginning of more institutionalized
forms of cooperation. The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the most
prominent Baltic-wide organization, was founded in 1992, numerous other
organizations followed during the next few years2. The BSA as we know it
today was created in the early 1990s.
All this activity and all these visions and dreams expressed a decade ago
were responses to the greatest turning point in the history of our time: the
collapse of the bipolar world. The Berlin Wall crumbled in 1989; the Soviet
Union disintegrated a couple of years later. The breakdown of the old order
was followed by a formative moment – an era of uncertainties.3 Previous
self-evidences disappeared; the world became more unpredictable. A
majority, particularly in the former West, perceived the blurring of the
East/West divide as a threat, and attempted in different rhetorical ways to
keep the former East alive as an image of the “other”. However, many also
recognized that the world was becoming more flexible and that the new
situation offered opportunities to shape one’s own brave visions. The ideas
of a BSA obviously belong to the latter group. Therefore, I consider the BSA
to be a product of the transition period.
Rhetoric on transition has become a regular discursive method to label the
former East during the past decade and to preserve it as something still
essentially different from the former West. Many observers are convinced
that the transition era is now finally approaching its end and a new
international order is emerging. The 11th September was in many ways a
symbolic turning point; as Pertti Joenniemi argues in his article in the
current volume, those terrorist attacks also affected the BSA. It is, in fact,
more correct to state that the events of 9/11 accelerated the existing trends.
The Baltic States achieved their long-term political goals when they were
granted membership to the two symbolic ‘Western’ organizations – NATO
and the EU. When these memberships will be finally realized next year,
something will definitely have changed. Under the leadership of President
Putin, Russia also intensified its proximity to the former West in recent
years. Hence, there is no longer a security deficit among the Northern
European states. Traditional security constellations are diminishing swiftly,
but it remains unclear what the new premises will be.
In May 2004, the BSA will finally be transformed from a sea separated by
the East/West divide (whether an Iron or a Silk Curtain) to an almost-inland
lake of the EU, the uniformity of which is broken only by the Russian
presence in the area: the problematic Kaliningrad region and St. Petersburg
and its environs. Furthermore, the BSA will then be linked closely to the
Euro-Atlantic space. These changes would certainly contribute to the
visions of the future, where early dreams are fulfilled and old fears
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Interwar Experiences
Before analyzing current history, it is rewarding to recall and review the
interwar years. On the one hand, the interwar years share striking
similarities with the post-Cold War period; on the other hand, the eras are
significantly different. The collapse of the Russian (Soviet) Empire and the
appearance of the small sovereign Baltic States are characteristic of both
turning points; a BSA was conceived during both formative moments as a
vision for constructing a “brave new world”.
The BSA was first introduced and formulated as a political program in the
aftermath of World War I. At least in Estonia and Latvia, the Baltic League
was the dominating political vision in the early 1920s, which was later
followed by the idea of Baltoscandia. The basis of this spatial thinking was
an imagined space between Germany and Russia, including the Baltic
States (with Finland) and the Scandinavian states. This space was
perceived as a region of small and democratic nation-states. However, the
plan envisaged combining these different states through several kinds of
ties: joint organizations and regulations, a common currency, etc. At that
time, however, the Scandinavians were not interested in cooperation with
the Balts. Nonetheless, a unique form of regional cooperation emerged
among the five eastern Baltic States: some 40 joint conferences were
organized over a seven-year period. When this cooperation ended after the
mid-1920s, however, the idea of a BSA was abandoned. It was revived
briefly in the 1930s in academic discussions in the form of Baltoscandia –
but without any political effects.4
If one cites the interwar period as a possible example for the current
development, it is necessary to comprehend why at the time the BSA was
essential and why it only lasted less than a decade. I would suggest that the
problem of smallness made the BSA essential. Prior to the war, there was
no experience of small nation-states in Europe (with the possible exception
of the Balkans). Small states were not perceived as particularly viable
entities. Before – and even during – the war, the Estonians, Latvians,
Lithuanians and even Finns would have been satisfied with an autonomous
position within a federalized and democratic Russia; the step to full
sovereignty was taken mainly because of the Bolshevik coup and the
changes in the international situation. Before the war, the Baltic States were
not even administrative units in the Empire (as they were in the Soviet
Union). They had to commence the construction of their independence from
scratch; they did not have political, legal or economic infrastructures of
theirs own – no currency, no army, no law and not even any traditions of
governance. At the same time, the three Baltic States were not recognized
de jure until early 1921; hence, they were unable to partake in international
cooperation or to sign international treaties. During this period of transition
to full sovereignty, the Baltic group formed a community of solidarity,
allowing all kinds of problems, either on security or on economic issues, to
be solved jointly. “The power of a small nation is in its uniting with other
small nations” was the Estonian expression of the dominant view in the
early 1920s. The vision of a BSA was primarily functional and based on the
similar fate and position of these lands in Europe. The so-called naturalizing
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beginning; if history was mentioned at all, it was only current history. First
later, in the 1930s, geography emerged as the main naturalizing argument
for the BSA.6
Baltic cooperation already lost part of its significance when the Baltic States
were recognized in 1921. The change in the international atmosphere until
the mid-1920s effected an even more significant turn. The early years after
the war were characterized by a certain degree of idealism and a readiness
to create federations and leagues for securing peace; that also inferred a
certain readiness to blur the limits of sovereignty for the sake of
integration.7 By the mid-1920s, a new, more limited definition of sovereignty
was established; now, the new nation-states became entities that were
more exclusive. In international policy, different kinds of guarantee systems
– such as that of the Locarno Pact – were planned and created to secure
the existing boundaries of sovereign states. The idea of a Baltic pact was
an attempt to adapt the BSA to this new world. Those efforts failed,
however.
Another important reason for the waning of cooperation was that not
everyone shared the idea and the mission. The Scandinavians had already
refused to cooperate in 1920 and Finland remained throughout a reluctant
Baltic partner and lost interest after the mid-1920s. Thus, the first
experience of the BSA did not last beyond the end of the transition period –
of which it had been the product. In returning to the beginning of the 21st
century, the question that inevitably arises is: “Could the new BSA suffer the
same fate, too?”
A Future Region
The new BSA was as much the product of the transition period as its
predecessor and it was invented to resolve and conquer the uncertainties of
the era. Does the BSA have a sufficiently strong and established image to
survive the end of the transition era, or will the BSA become insignificant
during the decade that follows? In order to answer this question, it is
necessary to investigate why the BSA was required originally.
In 1989 and 1990, the general discussion on the content and possibilities of
a BSA was launched all around the Baltic Rim. Then, the BSA was created
as a future region. The question that must be asked is: “Why were the
hopes for a new and better future channeled towards a BSA?” Prior to
1989, the experiences of the interwar years were long forgotten and the
BSA was a non-existent unit for political co-operation. Thus, the BSA was a
kind of blank page ready to be written on, but this does not explain why it
was the BSA in particular, and not some other region, that was seen to be
an essential construct of the new world.
According to my analysis, there were actually several needs to be satisfied,
and the BSA fulfilled these requirements excellently.8 Firstly, to the Western
mind, the disintegrating East appeared to pose different threats – from
pollution and mafia-type crime to more abstract fears concerning the
European order. Thus, the BSA was intended not only to supersede the old
East/West division, but also to replace the Iron Curtain with a Silk Curtain.
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feeling of moral responsibility towards the Baltic States. Carl Bildt, in a
speech in 1993, expressed the prevailing presentiment that Sweden had
abandoned the Balts in the 1950s and that this should not happen again.9
Another side of this feeling of responsibility was the patronizing attitude of
the Nordics towards the Balts, which has its roots deep in the Nordic
self-image of being morally superior.10 A certain patronizing policy
manifested itself clearly in the early phases of Baltic Sea cooperation, the
original targets of which were selected by Scandinavian or German
politicians. Part of the agenda of the First Conference of Foreign Ministers
of the Baltic Sea States in Copenhagen in March 1992 was the idea of
assisting the creation of new democratic institutions. The same rhetoric can
be understood in terms of a Western mission to introduce a Western kind of
democracy into the East, to standardize the BSA and, hence, to control a
disintegrating East. The Baltic States can thus be described as a kind of
‘Nordic Near Abroad’.11 Apparently, the need to guide the Balts was a
primary motive for founding the Council.
Furthermore, the fear of being marginalized in a new Europe was a key
issue in the Nordic countries and in Northern Germany in the early 1990s.
Then, Sweden and Finland had not become members of the EU. Moreover,
a decade ago, the peoples in the North were initially frightened not only by
the upheavals in the East but also by the deepening integration in the West
and the rhetoric of the Europe of the regions.12 The Nordic idea was so
solidly anchored in the realities of the Cold War era that the collapse of the
Soviet system and the emergence of sovereign States on the other side of
the Baltic Sea not only affected the image of Eastern Europe but also shook
the basis of the image of Norden.13 Therefore, there was a desperate need
among the countries for a new region, one in which they could play a
central role in the future Europe. The concept of a BSA appeared to satisfy
this need. It was seen as a potential economic growth zone capable of
challenging the established regions of Western Europe and, in particular, a
region where the Swedes, Danes or Northern Germans – depending on
who was doing the imagining – would be the most prominent nation in the
region.
Furthermore, one must bear in mind that novel ideas were appealing in the
midst of the change and that the new rhetoric about the Europe of the
regions became such a novelty in the European North.14 All these various
phenomena can be comprehended as different tactics to possess and
manage the disintegrating East and to transform it from otherness to
sameness.
The Contested Baltic Sea Area
Nowadays, a decade or more since the Baltic Sea-cooperation began, it is
important to outline first the present guise of the BSA and determine how it
corresponds to the early hopes and needs. Furthermore, the question
arises as to whether these hopes and needs are still relevant. During the
past few years, the image of the former East, in particular that of the Baltic
States, has developed from that of a set of weak and unstable states to one
of normal sovereign states – despite the fact that a relic of the ‘Easternness’










A Product of the Transition Pe
Interwar Experiences
A Future Region
The Contested Baltic Sea Area
Fußnoten
zur Startseite
NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Marko Lehti
for a long time. Missionary aims in Baltic cooperation have already begun to
dissipate: this was especially the case after the mid-1990s, when – as noted
– the Baltic States established more clearly their position as normal
sovereign powers.15 When the Baltic States eventually become EU and
NATO members next year, I believe they will finally convince their neighbors
of their adulthood as sovereign states. Therefore, the BSA is no longer
required to control or even patronize the Baltic States that will be part of the
same core of Europe. On the other hand, new regional initiatives such as
the Northern Dimension Initiative are necessary to control and manage
Europe beyond the future borders of the EU.
I am also genuinely convinced that Scandinavians, Finns or Northern
Germans are no longer as fearful of their marginalization as they were a
decade ago; they have now all found their place in the integrating Europe.
The decade after the emergence of the new post-Cold War Europe was
characterized as a kind of ‘hangover’, in which new identities and relations
with the rest of Europe took shape. During the past few years, however, the
Swedes and Danes in particular have obviously managed to re-evaluate
their relation with Europe. The Nordic idea has not disappeared; the
Swedes, for example, rediscovered themselves – as described by Lars
Trägårdh – as ‘the most modern and most successful of nations’, only in
new ways. The reluctant Europeanness characteristic to the Nordics is
perceived not as a problem, but rather as part of Nordic self-esteem.16 I
believe the need for alternative centers such as that of the BSA is no longer
as urgent as it was. On the other hand, Nordic circumstances are no longer
the same as they were before; there is now a greater openness towards the
East. Even if the Nordics are not ready to take the Baltic States into the
Nordic Council, the Balts have entered into various spheres of Nordic
cooperation.17
The international order is also changing. At least at first sight, it appears as
if modernity is hitting back; traditional actors – particularly the individual
states – again dominate the development. The post-9/11 era has been
characterized by the war against terrorism, the war of established sovereign
states against a non-sovereign and non-territorial threat. In world politics,
the remaining super power, the USA, dominates the scene in a more
arrogant manner than a decade ago. At the same time, EU politics have
emphasized the role of individual states and their conflicting interests more
than regionalization, the blurring of boundaries and the development
towards the European Federation. In the Baltic context Baltic Sea
cooperation began as an initiative from below, but already the foundation of
the CBSS in 1992 brought the control over the regionalization process back
to the single states and thus took it away from the NGOs. The question
arises as to whether there is any more need for this kind of a pilot region of
new regionalism in the new international atmosphere.
Therefore, it seems that the BSA has already lost its position in the political
forum, in the world of sovereign states. The BSA does not serve as an
important argument in present-day European policy. This could change if
the Balts and the Russians discover a new form of BSA. For them, however,
the BSA has been hitherto more a functional rather than an identity-political
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recent times, it has generally been a Western Baltic initiative; in the future,
however, both fronts must contribute. The realization of EU and NATO
membership next year may require the use of a Baltic Europe in order to
emphasize one’s own position and uniqueness. There is, however, little
evidence thus far to suggest this. Even if the national identities of the Balts
have changed, the BSA has not been used as a source for a new, more
arrogant identity. Instead, the new identity is based more on the idea of
successfully managing the transition era and the rapid adoption of an
information society in the vein of ‘old’ Europe. The latter argument has also
been characteristic of the Nordics in their re-evaluation of Nordicity. In the
Estonian case, the Estonian Foreign Minister Kristina Ojuland coined the
phrase of ‘the tiny Tigers of Europe’ in her speeches to describe the new
image, a reference to the famous Asian Tigers of South Korea, Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Singapore.19 The recent debate concerning support for the
military action in Iraq also clearly shows the difference between the
candidate states who stood firmly behind the US-led bloc, and the Nordic
states (excluding Denmark) and, in particular, Germany, who were more
hesitant and argued for a peaceful solution.20 Interests and needs still differ
a lot – as it is also the case between the old and the new members of the
EU – and it is rather unrealistic to believe that there would be a Baltic
Sea-bloc in the EU in the future.
The BSA is obviously facing a period of change in the international
atmosphere similar to the mid-1920s. Then, the BSA did not survive. Is
Baltic cooperation waning in a manner similar to the 1920s? It is at least
clear that the early vision of the BSA has not yet become outdated and that,
even despite the drastic change in the international context, no new vision
has been presented. These are not, however, merely the arguments for the
disappearance of the BSA. It is also possible to find supporting evidence for
the survival of the BSA. The comeback of modernity is still only apparent.
Globalization, localization and integration within Europe are continuing and
expanding processes.
The manner in which the natural existence of the Baltic Sea world is stated
is fundamental to the survival of the BSA. To exist, its existence has to be
justified. Different functional reasons – control of the disintegrating East,
pollution, avoiding marginalization and so on – are important for explaining
the necessity of Baltic Sea cooperation, but there has been only one clear
argument for the naturalness of the BSA, and that has been based on
history. The BSA, it was argued, was not a new region but rather something
that was returning. However, explanations have differed as to what exactly it
was that was returning. For the Northern Germans, it was the glorious days
of the Hansa, when Lübeck was a leading town of the BSA, the Swedes
recalled more the Viking era or their 17th-century Baltic Empire. During the
Cold War years, the view of history was restricted within the limits of the
existing state boundaries. It was only during the new formative moment that
a country’s own past could be seen in a context beyond its present
boundaries.21 In the current narratives on the BSA, it is a question of
extended national narratives recounted at a time when European
dividing-lines and borders were blurring. Thus, the BSA was and is an
identity issue, too, but Baltic identities are associated with national










A Product of the Transition Pe
Interwar Experiences
A Future Region
The Contested Baltic Sea Area
Fußnoten
zur Startseite
NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Marko Lehti
own nation into the BSA of the past? The boom of historical narration is
certainly over, but, on the other hand, many of these narratives have
continued their existence and found new expressions. The BSA has
remained an important coordinate in new national narratives that can no
longer be confined within the limits of current boundaries.
The main difference between the interwar and the post-Cold War years is,
however, the level of institutionalization that has taken place in the 1990s.22
All the existing tens or hundreds of organizations and networks will, in my
opinion, guarantee that the BSA will still exist in the year 2010 – the role
and significance of the BSA in 2010 will be another question. Another major
difference between the interwar and post-Cold War periods is the strong
presence of civil society – the world of the NGOs – in cooperation. It was
also present in the interwar years, but this forum currently still constitutes an
expanding part of Baltic cooperation. The academic world offers an
excellent example of this sphere.23
Looking to the future, I believe the BSA will – or already has – become a
‘space of flows’. This term, used by Manuel Castells, outlines the difference
between relations based on hierarchies and thus forming a ‘space of places’
and, on the other hand, those of networks, in which the relations are more
or less between equals. According to Castells, the current world, based on
the latest revolution of information technology and on the globalization of
the economy, supports the emergence of a networking society.24 It may
nonetheless be possible that, even in the era of network societies, imagined
geographical images are required to provide some framework for
networking. If so, the BSA offers one established framework. It is quite
impossible to forecast what meaning and reflections this existence of the
space of flows will have, but it certainly will have some effect and it keeps
the BSA alive and well beyond the political discourse. Europe is not
returning to a modern era dominated only by sovereign states, but the
processes of networking are continuing in several spheres of public life and
they are blurring state boundaries. This development will accelerate when
almost the entire BSA enters the EU. Most of its ventures – such as the
newest Sixth Framework Program25 – strongly support and guide
networking. The BSA has already existed so long that its connections and
ties offer an excellent ground for further networking.
The BSA is no longer in the spotlight of high politics. It has become a
familiar issue, arousing neither great desires nor tensions. That is not to
say, however, that the BSA has disappeared or is disappearing. It does
continue to exist as part of the networking society of the North, but the
states involved have lost much of their interest to develop and use the BSA.
As a region, the BSA is a post-modern creation; it continues to exist very
much beyond but not separate from the world of states. It also has
characteristics of the modern era, however, since the foundation narrative of
the BSA relies on national histories. This type of networking is not a novelty
in the history of the BSA, though. In the pre-modern era, the BSA also
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